Internet of Things (IoT) networks are becoming a part of our daily lives and the number of IoT devices around us are surging. The authentication of millions of connected things and the distribution and management of shared keys between these devices pose challenging research problems. Current oneto-one authentication schemes do not take the resource limitations of IoT devices into consideration. Nor do they address the scalability problem of massive machine type communication (mMTC) networks. Group authentication schemes (GAS), on the other hand, have emerged as novel approaches for many-tomany authentication problems. They can be used to simultaneously authenticate many resource-constrained devices. However, existing group authentication schemes are not energy efficient, and they do not provide enough security for widespread use. In this paper, we propose a lightweight GAS that significantly reduces energy consumption on devices, providing almost 80% energy savings compared to the state-of-the-art solutions. Our approach is resistant to the common replay and man-in-themiddle attacks.. The proposed approach also includes a solution for key agreement and distribution in mMTC environments. Moreover, this approach can be used in both centralized and decentralized group authentication scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
A thing in an Internet of Things (IoT) network can be defined as a physical or virtual node which connects to the Internet and has the ability to communicate with other nodes [1] , [2] . Security and privacy are crucial points in the advancement of IoT networks. The IoT paradigm extends the capabilities of the Internet to mobile and sensor networks. Each node is connected to the network and is also capable of communicating with each other. The confidentiality and integrity of data and the authentication of nodes are the main security issues for IoT networks [3] . Authenticating each node remains a key challenge. Authentication is a process for ascertaining that an entity really is who it claims to be [4] . It is one of the most important processes in the access control chain, since all other security and data transmission operations follow after the authentication process.
There will be numerous connected nodes around us in the near future which are connected to us and/or to each other. Most of them have limited computing power and battery capacity. Therefore, the use of traditional cryptographic methods is not possible for the authentication process of resourceconstrained IoT nodes. IoT networks typically have a threelayer design, comprised of a sensing layer, a network layer, and an application layer. The sensing layer consists of IoT nodes with various sensing capabilities. The network layer aids transmission of the sensed data to the servers. Typically, gateways are used as the devices that provide the connection between the application layer and sensing layer, along with routers and other packet forwarding devices. Traditional authentication methods can be used in gateways since these devices have relatively high computational power. On the other hand, lightweight authentication solutions are needed for the sensing layer nodes.
In traditional authentication methods, the client and authentication server usually have the shared key before communication. A random value, which is selected and sent by the server to the client, is encrypted by the client with the shared key, and the encrypted value is sent back to the server. Finally, the server validates the client by decrypting the response. In this process, there is one claimer and one prover. The prover can only authenticate one user at a time. So this approach is not scalable for densely deployed IoT networks where millions of nodes are expected to be operational. Although the problem of providing connectivity to all these nodes is currently being addressed by 3GPP in Release 16 under the name massive machine-type communications (mMTC), the scalability of the authentication process remains to be addressed.
According to IMT-2020's mMTC requirements, over 1 million nodes can operate in a single km 2 [5] . Although the security issues of mMTC networks are visible and currently being studied by the research community [6] , to the best of the authors' knowledge there are no standardization efforts targeting the scalability of device authentication in these networks [7] . Each mMTC node must perform individual authentication with an authentication server according to the current evolved packet system authentication protocol (EPS-AKA) in mobile networks [8] . This can cause high signaling overhead on the server. One of the bottlenecks in this scenario is that all IoT nodes can request authentication from the server at the same time, and the server cannot respond to all the requests. A fast authentication proposal is required to authenticate all users at the same time.
Group authentication is one of the best solutions to minimize the load on the authentication server. Millions of nodes in IoT can create groups according to their coverage area or functions in the system. Instead of sending all authentication requests to the server, authentication within the group will reduce the load of the server. The many-to-many group authentication idea was proposed by Harn in [9] and developed further by Chien in [10] .
Existing group authentication approaches do not take the resource constraints of the network into account. However, sensing nodes in an IoT environment frequently have limited memory, tight energy constraints, and very limited processing capability. So during the authentication process, the communication overhead on the nodes should be as little as possible. Also, the energy consumption of group authentication algorithm should be as low as possible. For this reason, traditional cryptographic systems, along with existing group authentication methods, are not proper for IoT and lightweight systems must be proposed.
Group authentication in wireless communication environments is more vulnerable to attacks by unauthorized entities. Man-in-the-middle attacks can be performed by anyone who can capture group credentials. Hence, group authentication algorithms must provide security for attacks on wireless channel. Existing group authentication approaches remain vulnerable to such attacks.
Another challenge for IoT networks is the need for secure communication between nodes without any human intervention. For secure communication between millions of mMTC nodes, each node must have a shared key. In such a crowded environment, key distribution and management consume too much time and energy.
In light of these challenges, our main contributions are as listed:
• We propose a flexible lightweight authentication scheme to overcome the possible problems in group authentication and that can be used in centralized or decentralized group authentication scenarios. Group members share their private keys publicly in other group authentication schemes. If an intruder can eavesdrop on group traffic, the intruder can recover the group secret. • Our proposed approach offers a group key for mMTC. At the end of the group authentication, each group member can recover the same group key for further communications. The mMTC nodes communicate with each other by symmetric key encryption once they have a group key. In terms of privacy and security, the private keys are not used for group authentication, which secures the privacy of group members and prevents intruders from capturing private keys and performing man-in-the-middle, impersonation or replay attack. • Lightweight schemes are vital for IoT scenarios due to the resource constrained nodes. When we compare our proposal with other group authentication schemes, the energy consumption of one node can be reduced by 80%. Additionally, the energy consumption remains constant even if the number of group members increases. This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of security requirements for IoT and an overview of existing group authentication methods. In Section III, our proposed approach for group authentication is presented. The security and performance evaluation is provided in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Conclusions are presented in Section VI. The study is completed by an overview of future work suggestions in Section VII.
II. RELATED BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW
There are three layers in IoT architecture as shown in Figure  1 . As the first layer, the sensing layer provides information from the field to the upper layers. The components in this layer include sensors of diverse applications or radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and readers [3] . The network layer is the mediator between the sensing and application layers and is responsible for the secure transmission of information from the former to the latter. This network layer mostly relies on traditional networks such as the Internet, mobile communication networks, satellite networks, or wireless networks [3] . The application layer, for its part, provides services to users. Each layer must have different security requirements according to the capabilities of the layer components. Our proposed approach focuses mostly on the sensing layer due to the computational restrictions on IoT nodes. We propose a lightweight scheme to provide authentication and key agreement for nodes in the sensing layer. Our proposed approach is based on the group authentication technique used to combat scalability problems that arise as the number of components in IoT networks increases.
Studies on group authentication have mostly focused on secret sharing schemes. In general, a group key is divided into a number of shares via a secret sharing algorithm that distributes private keys among users. Users share their private keys with each other, and each user can recover the group key after by using their private keys up to a threshold value. Finally, group users can communicate with each other securely by a symmetric key encryption.
Harn proposed a group authentication method based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme (SSS) [9] . According to Shamir [11] , a secret value D is divided into n pieces and the secret can be recovered by having k pieces. However, even if one owns k − 1 shares, the secret can not be recovered. The scheme is called (k,n) threshold scheme. Drawing on SSS, Harn proposed three group authentication schemes: one basic scheme and two asynchronous schemes. In the basic scheme, the group manager (GM), the most powerful member of the group with the most resource capabilities, selects a polynomial
The first coefficient a 0 is the group key. The GM computes one private key f (x i ) and one public key x i for each user U i . Then, the GM shares private keys with related users. In the group authentication phase, each user shares their private key with other users. After having t ≥ k private keys, each user can compute the group key by the Lagrange interpolating formula:
The basic algorithm is secure if the users share their private keys simultaneously. Otherwise any attacker can capture k private keys and recover the polynomial. Then, the attacker also can share a valid private key. Due to the vulnerabilities of the basic scheme, Harn proposed two asynchronous group authentication schemes. The first of the asynchronous authentication schemes, given in [9] , is for one-time authentication. In the preparation phase, the GM selects t values such that kt > n − 1 and selects random polynomials, f l (x), l = 1, 2, . . . , t, having degree k − 1. The GM generates tokens, f l (x i ), l = 1, 2, . . . , t, for each group member U i . The GM then finds the integers w j , d j , j = 1, 2, . . . , t, such that the secret key, s, is
for every pair of i and j. The GM makes these integers w j , d j , j = 1, 2, . . . , k, and H(s) publicly known where H(·) is a cryptographic hash function. In the group authentication phase, each user U i uses its tokens and computes
and shares the computed value with other group members. After having, c r , r = 1, 2, . . . , m, each group member computes
If H(s ) is equal to H(s), all users will have been authenticated. Outside attackers cannot derive any private token from the released c i value. Therefore, the approach provides security for asynchronous group authentication. However, it is a onetime authentication since the secret is no longer a secret once it has been recovered [9] . The second asynchronous authentication scheme was designed for multiple authentications. In this case, the GM selects two large prime numbers, p and q, such that q divides p − 1, and selects g i which is a generator of GF (q). Next, the GM selects two polynomials, f l (x), l = 1, 2, having t − 1 degree, and generates tokens f l (x i ), l = 1, 2, for each group member U i . There are multiple secrets selected by the GM. For each secret, the GM then selects random integers, w i,j , d i,j , j = 1, 2, and computes secrets
The GM makes these integers w i,j , d i,j and g i , H(s i ) publicly known. In the group authentication phase, each user U i uses their tokens and computes
and then computes e i = g ci i shares the computed e i value with other group members. After having, e i , i = 1, 2, . . . , m, each group member computes
If H(s i ) is equal to H(s i ), all users will have been authenticated. According to the security analysis by Harn, it is infeasible to recover c i value from e i due to the discrete logarithm problem. In other words, private user tokens are protected from released values. Also, even if an attacker obtains the secret s i , it is infeasible to recover 2 j=1 d i,j f j (w i,j ) values because of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). To put it differently, private user tokens are protected [9] .
Chien [10] has shown that the Harn asynchronous schemes have some critical weaknesses. If an attacker can get k distinct values in k different trials, the secret function chosen by the GM can be solved and all users' secrets can be obtained. It is proved in [10] with simple examples that an attacker can recover group secret values and user private tokens. Chien introduced a new method based on SSS, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and pairing-based cryptography in order to ensure a secure group authentication process with multiple trials and multiple authentications. In this new method, according to Chien, the GM selects two additive groups G 1 and G 2 , and one multiplicative group G 3 with order q. The GM makes a generator P for G 2 public. A polynomial with degree t − 1 is chosen. The constant term of the polynomial will be the master secret s. The value of
is then computed and shared publicly. For each user, one public key x i and one private key f (x i ) are chosen and shared with the related users secretly. Users participating in the authentication phase agree on a random point R v in G 1 . Then, each user computes
and releases c i R v . After all users release the
and verifies whether
holds. In Chien's approach, group members can authenticate each other, but they can not recover the group key for further communications. Extra steps are required in order to obtain the group secret value by each group member. According to the security analysis by Chien, the private tokens are protected due to the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Accordingly, it is infeasible to obtain c i values from c i R v as long as ECDLP is hard. In addition, for a valid c i R v and another point R 2 , one cannot compute c i R 2 as long as the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP) is hard. The last point in the security analysis for Chien's proposed approach is a bilinear pairing inversion problem(BPIP). Given the values e(R v , Q) and Q one cannot derive the value m i=1 c i × R v as long as BPIP is hard. If ECDLP, BPIP or ECDHP is not hard, any attacker can compute a valid value and participate in the group authentication.
In addition to the group authentication schemes described above, several studies have been proposed in order to reduce the computation and communication costs [12] - [14] . However, these approaches do not provide many-to-many authentication, i.e., the GM can not authenticate group members at the same time.
An authentication method is proposed in [12] for MTC to authenticate user equipments (UE) through the gateway as quick as possible. The gateway communicates with UEs one by one to have the tokens of UEs. The gateway authenticates UEs as a group via a home subscriber server. One-to-one communication between UEs and gateway causes additional communicational cost.
Asmuth and Bloom proposed a key safeguarding scheme, which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) in [13] . If anyone has shadows up to r, the secret value y can be computed easily using CRT. But anyone who has r − 1 shadows can not know the secret [13] .
The authors proposed an algorithm using Paillier threshold cryptography in [14] . They compared their results with Harn's group authentication method and presented the results from their experiments. The results from [14] show that their algorithm has a better computational time than Harn's group authentication algorithm. But they did not take into account the computational cost of public and private key encryptions or scalability issues.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD

A. Preliminaries
In the proposed algorithm, a group authentication process is performed first, after which group members recover group keys for further communication. Group authentication is crucial for the scalability of the system components and the resource usage of the group members. The group key agreement part of the algorithm is to provide machine-to-machine communication without the need of central authority.
We begin by introducing computationally hard problems, which are used by Harn and Chien, and compare them with our proposed approach. Definition 1. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is defined as [10] : given an elliptic curve over a finite field F p and two points P, Q over an elliptic curve, to find a integer k such that Q = kP is ECDLP. Definition 3. The bilinear pairing inversion problem is defined as [10] : Given e(P, Q) and a point Q to find the point P is the BPIP.
B. A Use-Case Example: Authentication Scenarios of Cloud-Based IoT
Before giving the details of our proposed approach, we provide an example of a scenario where our scheme could be used. Cloud-based IoT technology consists of three components: the cloud network, IoT gateways and IoT sensors. Each IoT sensor is the sensing node of the system. It provides real-time information from the field. The gateway is the contact point of the sensing layer with traditional networks. It transmits the information to the cloud through the Internet or a mobile network.
Authentication is one of the most crucial steps in cloudbased IoT technology. Each component must authenticate others before transmitting any information. The cloud must authenticate the gateways, and the gateways must authenticate the sensors as well. If the number of sensors is too high in an IoT network, a group authentication scheme is vital. As shown in Figure 2 , each gateway with its sensors creates a group. The critical point here is that the gateway has a higher computational capability than sensors. The gateway should be the group manager and perform group authentication before data transmission.
In a smart home or smart medical system, the sensors or machines can share data with each other. Therefore, a key agreement scheme is required to ensure the confidentiality of the data. Below, we propose a key agreement scheme after group authentication is completed. As illustrated by the scenario, a central authority is needed for group authentication. But if we assume that sensors will create a group without a gateway, there may not be a central authority. The appropriate selection of the group manager in this scenario becomes essential from the authentication perspective. For such an adhoc scenario, below we also propose group authentication without a group manager. Two options are noted at each step of our proposal. Hence, we provide a flexible and lightweight group authentication scheme that also scales with the number of increasing sensor nodes.
C. The Proposed Method
The GM is assumed to be infrastructure-based and has relatively more computational power. In addition to the GM, each group has several other members with resource or computational constraints. Note that in IoT environments, the GM is basically the gateway with specific capabilities. Sensor nodes or RFID tags can be considered to be the other members in a group. The capabilities of these nodes are at a certain restricted rate.
The proposed method has two stages. The first stage involves the authentication process, which is based on ECC and SSS. This first stage consists of two phases, which are called the initialization and confirmation phases. The second stage, which is the key agreement stage, provides a solution to construct a master key for further communications. The details of each phase are presented at below.
The Initialization Phase 1) GM selects a cyclic group G and a generator P for G.
2) GM selects E = Encryption(·) and D = Decryption(·) algorithms and a hashing function H(·). 3) A polynomial with degree t − 1 is chosen by GM and the constant term is determined as master key s. 4) GM selects one public key x i and one private key f (x i ) for each user in the group U where each user is denoted by U i for i = 1, . . . , n. 5) GM computes Q = s × P . 6) GM makes P, Q, E, D, H(s), H(·), x i public and shares f (x i ) with only user U i for i = 1, . . . , n.
The confirmation phase is executed after the GM shares the values with the related users. There are two different options in the confirmation phase. One is that the GM is responsible for confirming the group members (the centralized approach). The other is that any member in the group is responsible for confirming the other members (the decentralized approach). The member selection can be done on the basis of the instantaneous resource availability of each node, such as their battery levels.
The Confirmation Phase 1) Each user computes f (x i ) × P and sends f (x i ) × P |ID i to the GM and other users (ID i is the identification number of the user and symbol shows the concatenation of two values). Repeat.
else 9
User
for each user. Repeat.
2) If the GM verifies the authentication, the GM computes f (x i ) × P for each user and verifies whether the values are valid or not. 3) If the GM is not included in the verification process, any user in the group computes
for each user (m denotes the number of the users in the group and m must be equal or larger than t).
4) User verifies whether
holds. 5) If it holds, authentication is done. Otherwise, the process will be repeated from the initialization phase. Both authentication by the GM and by any group member is given in the Algorithm 1. It is clear that group members should only compute one elliptic curve multiplication operation. The users should send their identification numbers by concatenating with public shares in order to avoid confusion for further communications. This is because these public shares will be used by other users in further communications and in the group key agreement stage, and all members should know which public share belongs to which user.
After the authentication has been performed, users will communicate with each other by using symmetric key encryption. Shared key for symmetric key encryption will be calculated by senders and receivers.
Algorithm 2: The Group Key Agreement Stage
4 Each user computes H(s ). 5 if H(s ) is equal to H(s) then 6 Print 'Master Key is recovered'.
Repeat.
ECC is used in order to compute shared key between the group members. Let us set the key, K as
where y t = f (x t ), i.e., y t is the secret of the user U t . The sender will use their own private key (y i ) and the value sent by receiver (y j P ). The receiver will obtain the same key with a similar operation, i.e., combining its own key y j with the received data y i P . After this stage, group members can communicate with each other by a symmetric key encryption method. However, instead of using different keys for each user, the master key that was selected by the GM can be used as the group key. The problem is how the users will recover the master key. We basically exploit SSS and a symmetric key encryption method to share the master key in the group key agreement stage.
The Group Key Agreement Stage 1) Each user shares their own secret key f (x i ) with other users using symmetric key encryption. 2) Each user decrypts the values and obtains m different f (x i ).
3) Each user computes
s = m i=1 f (x i ) m r=1,r =i −x r x i − x r .(16)
4) Each user verifies whether
At the end of the group key agreement stage, each member within the group will recover the master key as given in the Algorithm 2. After the group key agreement process, the members of the group will be able to communicate with each other using the master key. In addition, the GM can update x i and f (x i ) values remotely using the master key in order to avoid replay attacks.
To sum up the foregoing, we propose a comprehensive solution for the authentication of users users belonging to the same group. A group authentication is accomplished with very low computational power on users in the first stage. A master key is recovered by all group users for a distributed environment in the second stage. The details of the security and performance analyses are given in the following parts.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze possible attacks to the presented algorithms above. Our proposal provides security for most man-in-the-middle and replay attacks as shown below.
Theorem 1: Group authentication cannot be performed without t valid public and private values.
Proof. Since the stated polynomial f (x) is of degree t − 1, it is necessary to know t distinct pairs of (x,f (x)) for the formation of the polynomial again. f (x) cannot be constructed by holding less than t pairs.
Theorem 2: The attacker who captures the value of Q and P sent by the group manager publicly cannot have knowledge of secret s.
Proof. Given two points P and Q on an elliptic curve group, it is hard to find the s value that provides the relationship Q = s × P . This open problem is called ECDLP. Therefore, it is hard to find s by having Q and P .
Theorem 3: The attacker who captures the value of f (x i )P sent by the group members to the GM cannot have knowledge of f (x i ).
Proof. Due to the hardness assumption of ECDLP, it is hard to find f (x i ) by having f (x i )P .
Theorem 4: The attacker can capture f (x i )P and f (x j )P but can not obtain a valid symmetric key in order to establish a communication with user U i .
Proof. The attacker will need f (x j ) to compute f (x j )f (x i )P but f (x j ) is a secret known only by the user U j . In other words, the attacker should be able to solve the computational ECDHP.
Theorem 5: The attacker can not perform replay and manin-the-middle attack.
Proof. An attacker can eavesdrop or cut the traffic between the GM and any user and capture f (x i )P . After having f (x i )P , the attacker can be part of the authentication process. Because the attacker does not have any valid f (x i ), the attacker can not communicate with any other group member by using symmetric key encryption after the authentication process.
Below we also list the vulnerabilities associated with the proposed approach.
Vulnerability 1: The attacker can perform denial of service (DoS) attacks for the authentication process.
Proof. An attacker can share a non-valid value when the members send their shares to the GM who will confirm the authentication. The GM can not compute the group secret value and repeat the process. An attacker can share the nonvalid value again and perform denial of authentication.
Vulnerability 2: The node compromise attack can be performed.
Proof. If the attacker could physically capture a group member then the attacker might obtain the secret key of the member. As a result of capturing the secret key, the attacker can generate a valid public key and share it with the GM in order to authenticate itself. If the attacker has a secret key, the attacker can also communicate with the other members of the group by producing symmetric keys.
Vulnerability 3: The group members can perform DoS attacks for confirmation point.
Proof. If the group members send their shares to the confirmation point at the same time, this certain point can be locked. The solution for this kind of DoS attack is still a challenge in group authentication research.
The joint design of group authentication with an authentication handoff between different groups is also crucial for an environment with millions of nodes. The groups exchange several nodes between each other. Repeating the group authentication process for each new node is resource and time consuming. One of our future works will cover the design of a handoff scheme in mMTC or cellular environments, as noted in Section VII.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Group authentication is a novel method to increase the performance of the authentication system and to decrease the computational load on the group members. Additionally, the number of communications between a GM and group members is kept to a minimum in in group authentication.
The first parameter we used to compare the performance was the communication overhead. In battery constrained wireless environments, the communication between users should be as minimal as possible. In both Harn's and Chien's proposals, the users send a computed value to m − 1 users (m denote the number of users in the group). If we assume the cost of a communication between two group users is σ, (m − 1)σ communications are performed by one group member in both of the proposals in order to complete the group authentication process. In our framework, one user sends the computed value to m − 1 users as shown in Table I . The second parameter we used to compare the performance was the energy used by one user for group authentication. We used the time complexity approach in [10] to compare the computational complexity of our algorithm with the schemes of Harn and Chien's. In our algorithm, as well as in those of Harn and Chien, the GM is responsible for initializing the authentication. We only took into consideration the computations that were made by group members which were resource-restricted. While (45m + 1418)T mul,q [10] . T mul,q is the time for one multiplication in field F q where q is 160 bits, m is the number of user in the group. In our proposed approach, the group members should only compute one elliptic curve point multiplication (T EM ). According to Chien [10] , T EM is roughly equal to 29T mul,p (T mul,p denotes the time for one multiplication in field p where p is 1024 bits). The security of ECC with 160-bit key is roughly equivalent to that of RSA with 1024-bit key or D-H algorithm with 1024-bit key. Therefore; T mul,p is roughly equal to 41T mul,q [10] . In our authentication algorithm, group members compute 29T mul,p , which is 1189(29 × 41)T mul,q .
Confirmation of the authentication process was done by group members in Chien and Harn schemes. However in our scheme, the GM or only one user is responsible for the confirmation part of the authentication. As shown in Figure 3 , our proposed approach is scalable with the number of group members.
If we assume T mul,q is equal to 1 second and P , which is the maximum power that an IoT node can consume, is equal to 1 Watt, the energy consumption of one user in a group with 100 members is shown in Table II . 
VI. CONCLUSION
This study has proposed a novel method for authentication of group communication in mMTC networks. Manyto-many authentication is used for group authentication by several studies but resource-constrained nodes were forced to compute more than their capacity. In the proposed method, group members should only compute one elliptic curve point multiplication. Secret sharing scheme and ECC are used on the basis of the proposed algorithms. Most of the resourceconsuming work is done by the group manager or one of the group members, not by all the group members.
Both centralized and decentralized scenarios are supported by the proposed approach. In the centralized group authentication method, most of the resource consuming work is assigned to the group manager. Thus, energy-constrained group members do not need to consume a high amount of energy. In the decentralized group authentication method, only one of the group members, possibly with more computational capacity or more battery capacity than others, consumes more energy. The rest of the group members have a limited computational load, enabling them to function in an energy-efficient manner.
In existing group authentication approaches, attack possibilities still exist. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there are no proposals against replay, node compromise or DoS attacks under the framework of secret sharing schemes. Our proposal provides provides security against replay attacks if the GMs update the credentials for each authentication.
VII. OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS
Each group in the group authentication scheme is coordinated by the group manager. This architecture resembles the cellular model, where the communication within each cell is monitored and enabled through the base station. As nodes can be mobile in some IoT networks, defining a handoff process for mobile devices to be authenticated enables fast and reliable communication, possibly with a low latency. Hence, the joint design of group authentication with the authentication handoff is of critical importance to accommodate a large number of users that may also be mobile. Instead of repeating the group authentication process from the start, the new node must be authenticated by using a fast handoff scheme. For future works, such handoff schemes must be designed to support mobility in mMTC environments.
Another research problem lies in the configuration of the base stations. Current networks make use of fixed base stations to enable authenticated communication between mobile users. However, in next-generation (6G) wireless networks, an ultra-agile radio access architecture with mobile base stations (including aerial base stations) is envisioned as a solution for coverage and/or unexpected congestion problems [15] . One of the deployment challenges for such dynamic cell structures will be from the authentication perspective. Although current networks do not need the authentication of the base station, in the presence of a mobile aerial base station, these intermediate devices also need to be authenticated to avoid man-in-themiddle attacks. A fast authentication scheme will be required to provide authentication between mobile ground users and aerial base stations and/or between the aerial base station and the terrestrial base stations. Moreover, mutual authentication of all active aerial base stations will also be required. Furthermore, the handoff processes all of the aforementioned connections will need to be carefully designed. We believe that the proposed group authentication technique can serve as a foundation to these open research problems.
